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Conservation programs faced with limited budgets often use a competitive enrollment 
mechanism. Goals of enrollment might include minimizing program expenditures, 
encouraging broad participation, and inducing adoption of enhanced environmental 
practices. We use experimental methods to evaluate an auction mechanism that 
incorporates bid maximums and quality adjustments. We examine this mechanism’s 
performance characteristics when opportunity costs are heterogeneous across potential 
participants, and when costs are only approximately known by the purchaser. We find 
that overly stringent maximums can increase overall expenditures, and that when quality 
of offers is important, substantial increases in offer maximums can yield a better quality-
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Introduction 
Many environmental goods and services are generated from natural resources that are 
privately controlled. Thus, programs to enhance their provision require the participation 
of non-government actors. In many cases, these programs do not use regulatory 
approaches. Instead, the government pays owners of the resources to voluntarily change 
their practices.  
Assuming that the government prefers to minimize expenditures, or to maximize 
social welfare, program implementation needs to consider the design of an enrollment 
mechanism. The enrollment mechanism can consider a number of goals. These include:  
1.  Minimizing payment, with a target of paying the reservation price to participants;  
2.  Encouraging broad participation, so as to attract low-cost providers to the 
program; 
3.  Encouraging program participants to improve environmental quality whenever it 
is cost effective.  
Achieving this suite of goals may not be easy. The inherent difficulty arises because of an 
asymmetry of information – the government has superior information about how 
particular land-use decisions translate to environmental quality, while private landowners 
have superior information on the private cost of undertaking specific practices (Cason 
and Gangadharan (2004)). 
Motivation: the case of the CRP 
 
As an important example, consider the USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), 
which achieves its habitat and soil protection goals by paying landowners to retire their 
environmentally sensitive land from active crop production. The CRP’s enrollment 
mechanism is competitive, with interested landowners placing offers for acceptance into   - 3 - 




1.  Each parcel offered is scored using an Environmental Benefits Index (EBI). The 
EBI is a linear combination of several measures of the environmental benefits 
achieved by retiring the offered land, and the size of the payment demanded by 
the landowner (the bid). Only offers that achieve a target EBI are accepted. 
 
2.  Landowners can increase their EBI score by adopting beneficial conservation 
practices. However, landowners must incur some out of pocket costs to install 
these practices, thereby reducing their net revenues. 
 
3.  Landowner bids are capped, with the cap based on a soil rental rate derived from 
adjusting a county average agricultural land rental rate with a measure of the soil 
productivity of the offered land. 
 
In total, the CRP uses a sealed-bid reverse auction with (i) a maximum bid 
established by a quick-and-dirty land-rent assessment, and (ii) a quality-adjusted scoring 
method. That is, there are two mechanisms to limit the economic rent a landowner might 
achieve by participating in the auction: the soil rental rate (the assessment) and the EBI 
ranking (the quality-adjusted score).
4  
A critical component determining the total cost of operating the CRP is the 
asymmetric distribution of landowner opportunity costs. Some landowners have low 
opportunity costs (e.g. wheat growers in Montana) while others have high opportunity 
                                                 
2. See Reichelderfer and Boggess (1988), Shoemaker (1989), and Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 
(1997) for early reviews of the CRP, and Johansson (2006) and Kirwan, Lubowski and Roberts (2005) for 
detailed information on the CRP bidding mechanism and the Environmental Benefit Index.  
3. The CRP allows enrollment through two distinct mechanisms: the general signup (that accounts for most 
enrollments) and the continuous signup (that targets parcels eligible for highly desirable practices). The 
general signup is what we consider here; the continuous signup is not competitive. 
4. See Vukina, et al. (2008) for a paper concerned with the joint role of the cost factor and environmental 
score in determining participant bids.    - 4 - 
costs (corn growers in Iowa). Since the CRP is a national program, if a single-price 
mechanism were used, landowners with low opportunity costs could earn substantial 
economic rents. The use of some form of price discrimination, such as the bid caps, can 
deliver substantial savings to the government.  
But how effective are these bid caps? Prior work by Kirwan, Lubowski and Roberts 
(2005) finds that landowners are on average overpaid 20% relative to their opportunity 
costs, suggesting that landowners accepted into the program would have been willing to 
accept less. Similarly, Horowitz, Lynch and Stocking (2009) find that bids in an auction 
where the state purchases farmland development rights are 5-15% above landowner 
opportunity costs. Lowering the bid caps would, of course, lower the rent accruing to 
accepted landowners.  
On the other hand, lowering the bid caps is not without tradeoffs. If bid caps are 
lowered too far, potentially attractive offers are lost. Whenever the bid cap is below the 
actual opportunity cost of a landowner (which is unobservable to the government), the 
landowner will refuse to participate.
5 Thus setting a bid cap influences the total cost of 
operating the CRP in two ways: by lowering the rents that accrue to accepted bidders, and 
by potentially discouraging bidders from participation. This is the tradeoff the 
government must evaluate when setting bid caps. The government must make sure that 
the gain from limiting rents is not outweighed by the loss from excluding otherwise 
competitive bidders.
6  
This insight can be illustrated with the following simple example.  
 
                                                 
5. More precisely, the bid a landowner may receive is compared to a broadly defined “opportunity cost” 
that can include the full distribution of profitability (incorporating average returns and risk), and possible 
non-pecuniary benefits (i.e.; a landowner’s appreciation of natural habitat). 
6. This inherent tension is present in the workhorse model of auctions, the single-object Independent 
Private Values (IPV) model with symmetric bidders. In this model, the buyer sets a maximum bid primarily 
to prevent “bad outcomes,” i.e. to prevent purchase from a particularly high-cost bidder when competition 
is low. The maximum bid must not be set too low; a low maximum would prevent profitable exchange in 
many circumstances. See the classic paper by Myerson (1981), which shows the role of reserve prices in 
optimal auctions, and Bulow and Roberts (1989) to see how the optimal reserve price relates to standard 
economic theory.   - 5 - 
Assume there are 100 landowners, each with a unit of land of homogeneous 
environmental quality. However, the agricultural profitability is heterogeneous; in 
fact, it is uniformly distributed between $1 and $100. Lastly, assume the 
government’s goal is to retire 50 units of this environmentally homogeneous land, 
and to do so at minimum total cost.  
 
Consider two scenarios where the government uses imperfect assessments of each 
unit’s opportunity cost, and bases its offer on this assessment.  
1.  An unbiased assessment: the assessment is either $1 below the true 
opportunity cost, exactly equal to the true opportunity cost, or $1 above 
the true opportunity cost, with equal probability. That is, the assessment, 
i y , is equal to  ii y i ε = +  , where  i ε  is random variable that can take a  
value of -1, 0, or 1. On average, ⅓ of the assessments will be below the 
true opportunity cost, hence these parcels will not be offered. This yields 







= ∑ % ,where  y %  denotes the ordered 
assessments, i.e. the assessments ordered from lowest to highest, 
excluding all assessments that are below the true opportunity cost (all 
assessments where  1 i ε = − ).  
 
2.  A biased assessment that always adds $1.00 to the estimate above: 
1 ii yi ε =+ +. All units will be willing to offer, and will make (on average) 
$1 in rent. The 50 lowest assessments have a maximum cost of $52, and 







= ∑ % . 
Thus:  the use of an accurate and unbiased assessment can lead to a markedly worse 
outcome than would be achieved using a less accurate and biased assessment.
7 
 
                                                 
7 Note: a short MATLAB script that computes the above results is available from the authors upon request. 
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Given these kinds of issues with the bid cap mechanism, we are interested in several 
empirical questions that can affect the performance of auctions for environmental 
services:  
1.  What are the performance characteristics of a noisy assessment in an auction 
setting with asymmetric bidders?  
2.  How does a bidder’s ability to increase the quality of an offer, say by adopting 
more or fewer environmentally friendly conservation practices, affect bidding 
behavior and procurement costs?  
3.  How do these results change as the bid caps and scoring functions vary?  
 
Due to the complexity of an asymmetric, multi-unit bidding game, models with a 
closed form solution are not available. Furthermore, while there is a wealth of data on 
participants in conservation auctions (such as data on offers made to the CRP), there is 
little data on potential participants who never actually participate (say, eligible 
landowners who never submit an offer to the CRP). Therefore, we use laboratory 
experiments to address the preceding questions. In the lab, we are able to observe both 
potential and actual bidders, with a constant and observable distribution of costs. In 
addition, experiment participants can be subject to simultaneous variations in both bid 
caps and in the ability to increase offer quality. 
Experimental Design 
Nine 1.5 hour sessions were conducted, each session involving nine or ten participants. 
All participants were undergraduate students at the University of Maryland. During a 
session, between 30 and 50 independent auctions were held, with total payout to 
participants based on the sum of earnings across all the auctions. 
All auctions were conducted using customized software. In a given auction, each 
participant was presented with two tickets. These tickets, depicted onscreen, were the 
commodity that each participant offered to sell to a computerized buyer. On each ticket a 
cost was printed, and a text box labeled “offer box” was displayed. Subjects submitted 
bids simply by entering numbers into the offer box corresponding to the appropriate 
ticket. In some treatments, subjects were given the option of purchasing quality points (an   - 7 - 
abstraction of landowner’s ability to improve their EBI score by implementing practices 
on their land) by entering the desired quantity into a second text box. Participant earnings 
for accepted tickets were simply the offer amount minus the cost printed on their ticket 
(an induced value; Smith (1976)). When applicable, this cost includes the cost of 
purchasing quality points.
 For rejected tickets there was no loss – the cost was only 
imposed when an offer was accepted.  
In each auction, the 12 tickets with the lowest scores were accepted (11 tickets in 
the nine-participant sessions). A ticket’s score is calculated simply as the offer (the 
amount of payment the bidder requested for the ticket) minus the quality points the bidder 
elected to purchase. That is, quality points are scaled so that one extra quality point 
improves a bidder’s score by the same amount as lowering the offer price by one dollar. 
After each auction, participants were informed which of their tickets from the prior 
auction were accepted (if any), and their earnings. Bidders were also informed of the 
maximum accepted offer from the prior auction. Note that each participant could have 
zero, one, or two of their tickets accepted in each auction. 
To capture the asymmetry of costs, tickets were divided into four groups. The 
groups can be characterized as low cost with low variance, low cost with medium 
variance, medium cost with medium variance, and high cost with high variance. As 
described in Table 1a, these groups mimic important features of the CRP applicant pool.  
Two crucial assumptions underlie our method of assigning costs:  the purchaser 
(i.e. the government) can identify the group, and all parties (landowners and the 
government) know the cost distribution within each group. However, actual costs are 
only observed by the ticket holder (i.e. the landowner) – hence, price discrimination (in 
the form of an offer maximum) is group-specific (rather than participant-specific).  
As detailed in the Appendix, all cost draws are from uniform distributions with 
supports designed to construct the aforementioned cost groups. This design mimics a 
salient feature of the CRP – a portion of the opportunity cost of land is observable, and a 
portion is unobservable.
8 Each participant got one low-cost ticket, and one high-cost 
                                                 
8  Compared to the actual CRP, a ticket’s “group” proxies for observable features of an offered land parcel 
that correlate with profitability, such as the soil quality of offered land and the average cropland rental rate 
for the county.   - 8 - 
ticket. All participants were fully informed of the distribution of ticket costs, but had no 
information on the actual cost draws of other participants. 
A summary of treatments is given in Table 1b. Details of the treatments follow. 
 
Bid Caps 
Each ticket had a bid cap based on what group the ticket is in. These group-specific bid 
caps were imposed in each auction. The bid cap for each ticket was displayed onscreen, 
and participants were not allowed to exceed this amount.  
Quality Points 
As previously mentioned, bids with the lowest score, not necessarily the lowest-priced 
bids, were accepted. The score is simply given by: Offer Amount – Quality Points. We 
did not allow quality points (Q) to be purchased in all auctions, so that we could identify 
the impact that an endogenous score had on bidding behavior and total procurement cost. 
When quality points were available for purchase, participants could choose to purchase 
up to a maximum of Q “quality points.” Thus, participants entered both an offer amount 
and quality points. Earnings for accepted tickets were then calculated as  
  Offer Amount   0.5*Quality Points − . 
Note that each participant was subject to the same constraint on points, Q, and Q varied 
across treatments. Note also that quality points are valued at more-than-par by the 
government – they reduce a bidder's score on a one-to-one basis, but reduce a subject's 
earnings by only $0.50.  
 
Expectations 
It is useful to consider some expected experimental results, and the conditions that might 
change these expectations. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1. The low-cost, low-variance bidders will make offers equal to the 
bid caps when the bid caps are cost-effective.   - 9 - 
 
Our expectation is that the bidders with the very lowest opportunity costs will 
always be constrained by bid caps when these caps are set at cost-effective levels. That is: 
the marginal bid in each auction is expected to be well above the maximum bid (the bid 
cap) of every low cost, low variance bidder.
9 Thus we expect these bidders to be 
constrained by the bid caps under a cost-effective mechanism. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Auctions will outperform a single-price offered by the purchaser. 
 
  Prior work by Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2007) suggests that a single-price 
mechanism results in lower total costs than an auction. However, the environment we 
construct here is different from that considered by Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann.
10 The 
presence of identifiably distinct groups of bidders with endogenous quality choices more 
closely parallels the environment of the CRP. As we discussed above, if the government 
sets a single offer price too low, participation rates of otherwise competitive bidders 
might well drop significantly. In this environment, it might make sense to impose 
relatively high bids caps on individual groups of bidders, but to let competition determine 
the price paid by the marginal bidder. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. Competitive bidders, i.e. those submitting bids near the margin of 
acceptance, should purchase quality (Q points) in order to reduce their score and 
improve their chances of being accepted. Low cost bidders will not purchase 
quality points. 
 
                                                 
9 Since the participation of low cost bidders is important to cost minimization, the maximum allowable bid 
should not be set too low for this group. However, in many cases even a generous bid cap will still be well 
below the marginal bid. 
  
10. Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann do, in fact, make experimental subjects aware of their relative 
competitiveness. They do not, however, attempt to discriminate using different bid caps, as the CRP does, 
and as we do here.   - 10 - 
Bidders that want to reduce their score should do so first by purchasing quality 
points, as they are valued more than one-to-one by the buyer. Since Q points are valued 
more than one-to-one by the buyer, for bidders who wish to lower their score it is always 
optimal to first purchase up to Q  points, and then lower their asking price if a further 
score reduction is desired.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 4. A high Q can induce greater competition. 
A high  Q gives high cost bidders the ability to compete effectively by offering 
high quality bids (bids with a large amount of Q points). This extra competition may 
induce low cost bidders to lower their offers.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 5. If quality is important, increasing bid caps may be advantageous 
even though this may reduce competition.  
 
Relaxing bid caps allows low-cost bidders to improve the quality of their offers 
while increasing their profits, and do this without diminishing their probability of 
acceptance. While this can lead to an increase in the quality of accepted offers, it also 
means that low-cost bidders may receive greater rents. 
Design Issues 
The several questions addressed in this research are not readily characterized as 
independent decisions. Varying the stringency of bid caps, and increasing the opportunity 
to add quality points, are both likely to have continuous, but not necessarily linear effects 
on both individual bidding behavior and on aggregate performance. Moreover, the two 
effects may have interactions.  
  These essential features conditioned our experimental design. Given the non-
independent nature of our questions, a suitable set of pairwise comparisons of treatments 
would have been quite complex to administer, and hence difficult to implement. 
Therefore, our design was structured around providing data for regression analysis, rather 
then providing data for simpler tests (such as comparisons of means).  While a 
dependence on regression is not the norm in laboratory situations, adopting this strategy   - 11 - 
did offer several advantages. These included randomization of treatments within a 
session, testing for several levels of stimuli in various combinations, and using 
respondent-specific information when combining data across sessions. Similarly, session-
specific characteristics (such as due to changes in group size, or experience) can be 
controlled for. 
  
This strategy also permitted us to adapt our treatment schedule to add more variation 
where it was needed. In the spirit of Wald (1947), we adapt our design so that “the 
decision to terminate the experiment depends, at each stage, on the results of the 
observations previously made.” In practice, analysis and inspection of earlier round data 
provided information on where additional data was required, both in terms of additional 
rounds with the same treatment (so as to reduce variance by increasing degrees of 
freedom), and in presenting treatments with untested attributes levels (so as to reduce 
variance by expanding the range of data coverage).  In a colloquial sense, our design 
strategy encouraged “learning from the experiment”, in adapting treatments to insights 





Given the complexity of the bidding game, we focus on aggregate results rather than the 
behavior of individual subjects. While the micro-level decision making of bidders is 
interesting in its own right, we are primarily interested in aggregate outcomes such as the 
total cost of the program and the level of Q points purchased. In particular, we are 
interested in metrics that capture the cost-effectiveness of each treatment’s mechanism. 
Two different aggregate metrics are used as dependent variables. The first, a 
metric we call the cash rent ratio (CRR) ignores quality, and just examines the cost of 
acquisition. The second metric, which we call the score rent ratio (SRR) treats quality as   - 12 - 
commensurate with cost, in terms of acquisition goals. In each case, a normalization is 
used to condition-out idiosyncratic characteristics of an auction.
 11 
The CRR normalizes by the full information cost of obtaining the targeted goal 
(the normalization is by optCosts, a value we describe below). That is, we normalize by 
the cost of procuring A tickets in the hypothetical case when the purchaser can perfectly 
observe the true costs of all the tickets, and then buy any subset of these tickets at the true 
costs. Note that purchasing the A tickets with the lowest costs is also the most “efficient” 
mechanism, assuming that the “costs” represent opportunity costs (say, in the context of 








=∑  (1a) 
Where: 
  A = Number of accepted tickets, 
sCost = sorted costs. Thus, sCost1 is the cost of lowest cost ticket, and sCostT is 
the cost of the highest cost ticket. 
















t Offer  = Actual offer for ticket t. 
1 if offer is accepted (one of the   lowest offers), 0 otherwise. t Accept A =  
 
The score rent ratio normalizes by optQCosts, a measure which adds to optCosts the 
cost of obtaining the Q points obtained in an auction. Note that we do not know the 
number of Q points that will be obtained by the buyer in a given auction ex ante. As such, 
SRR is normalized by the lowest possible cost of obtaining the number of Q points that 
                                                 
11  To mimic how conservation programs such as the CRP are structured, our experimental auctions are 
based on an enrollment target, rather than on budget exhaustion or achieving a quality goal. This feature 
dictates what we use for normalization variables. 
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were actually obtained in a given auction, ex post. That is, we start with optCosts, and 
then assume that “after the fact” the total quantity of Q points obtained in the auction 
could have been purchased from the lowest-cost tickets. 






optQCosts A optCosts A Q Accept
=
=+ × × ∑  (2a) 
Where: 
t Q  = Q points included in ticket t’s offer, 
0.5 = Cost of a Q point. 
 

















The two dependent variables are regressed against several sets of independent variables: 
1.  Treatment dummies: these capture the effect of different levels of the maximum 
price, and different Q (maximum quality points) values. 
2.  Treatment and session descriptors: these capture the influence of variation in 
session participants, such as a measure of their prior experience with auctions. 
Note that these are based on session-specific statistics, such as the mean number 
of correct responses to a set of debriefing questions. 
3.  Session-specific fixed effects. These are dummies that capture unexplained 
factors specific to a session. Due to problems with rank, only subsets of these 
dummies can be used.
12 
                                                 
12  Several sets of dummies were experimented with. Since the qualitative differences were minor, in this 
paper we report results using four fixed effect dummies: for the fifth, seventh, ninth, and third or fourth 
sessions.  Hence, sessions one, two, three, six, and eight are treated as having the same level of fixed effect.  
For those interested, the complete regressions (including the coefficients for the fixed effect dummies) are 
available from the authors upon request.    - 14 - 
4.  A single-price cost is computed using the highest cost of an accepted ticket (as 
may be obtained using a reverse clock auction): singleCost () As C o s tA =× . A 
cost dispersion variable (cDispersion) is then computed as: singleCost/OptCosts. 
 
Summary Statistics 
In several regressions we compute a feasible, single-price acquisition cost. We use the 
cost of the smallest rejected offer, as would be the expected result of a multi-unit Vickrey 
reverse auction in a group of non-colluding rational players. 
  ( ) 1 A vickreyCost A A sCost + =×  (3a) 
Where:  
1 A sCost +  = the cost of the least expensive rejected offer. 
We generate a summary statistic that normalizes the above by the measure optCosts. 
That is, in Table 2 we report a summary statistic of:  





This variable provides a measure of cost variation – roughly speaking, the higher the 
value, the greater the distance between the “A+1” cost and the lowest cost. 
 












As reported in Table 2, values of Offers/vickreyCost greater than 1.0 signal that the 
auction does not yield lower costs than a feasible single-price mechanism. 
 
In Table 2 we also report the profit rate: 
                                                                                                                                                 























which is simply the net earnings divided by costs for the accepted tickets. Note that the 
costs of purchasing Q points are included in both the numerator and the denominator. 
  There were 9 different sessions. A total of 45 treatments were used across all 
sessions, encompassing about 340 separate auctions. Note that a number of treatments 
were repeated across sessions (see Table 1). Each auction had a different cost draw, with 
the first 5 sessions drawing from the “broader cost range,” and the next 4 from the 
“narrow cost range” (as described in Appendix 2). 
Table 2 displays summary statistics by cost range and by broad treatment type. 
The two broad treatment types are treatments with, and treatments without, quality 
points. 
  In general, it is not surprising that in the broad cost scenarios greater profit is 
found. For example, in the scenarios without Q points, comparing the treatments with a 
broad cost range to treatments with a narrow cost range, we see a decline in CRR from 
1.6 to 1.48 (though the standard errors are relatively large). Similarly, the profitRate is 
larger in the broad cost range sessions. 
There is mixed evidence on how incorporating quality affects efficiency: for the 
broad cost sessions, the normalized measures are similar (CRR when Q points are not 
available is close to SRR when Q points are available), while for the narrow cost sessions 
incorporating Q points seems to increase efficiency (from 1.48 to 1.21). 
 
These summary statistics reveal some insights on the hypotheses we stated above. 
  
The low-cost, low-variance bidders will make offers equal to the bid caps when the bid 
caps are optimally set.  
Using a criteria that a “low-cost” ticket is one whose maximum allowed bid is less 
than the round’s maximum accepted offer, about 75% (of about 1700 tickets) 
should and did bid at (or within a percent) of their maximum. Over 90% bid at 
least 90% of their maximum. Note that although a round’s maximum accepted   - 16 - 
offer is obviously not known at the moment a participant enters an offer, it does 
serve as a proxy for expectations.  
 
Auctions will perform better than a single price. 
Somewhat contrary to expectations, Offers/vickreyCost indicates that a “feasible” 
single-price mechanism is usually better than the receive-your-bid mechanisms 
used in these experiments. This result holds in both the broad- and narrow-cost 
scenarios. 
  As shown in Table 3, this result holds for all but the 90% maximum. That 
is, even in a receive-your-bid auction where a substantial fraction of the tickets 
cannot receive a payment at what would be the Vickrey price (because bids are 
constrained by bid caps that are lower than this Vickrey price), a Vickrey-style 
auction would still be cheaper. 
 
When Q points are available, participants should purchase the maximum feasible. 
Across all auctions, there were about 1,350 accepted offers that could purchase Q 
points to increase their profit without affecting their probability of being accepted. 
Of these, only 50% chose an optimal level of Q. About 40% could have increased 
their profits by 15% or more, just by increasing their level of Q. In fact, almost 
25% could have doubled their profits.  
  In treatments where explicit hints were given on optimal use of Q, over 
66% adopted an optimal strategy, yet still almost 20% could have doubled their 
profits. 
On the other hand, when low-earnings offers are dropped, these results are 
ameliorated, with 2/3 of offers purchasing an optimal amount of Q points, and 
only 2% being able to double their profit. In the rounds where hints were 
provided, almost 90% select an optimal amount of Q points. 
 
Tickets with sufficiently low maximums will not purchase Q points 
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Tickets whose bid cap was less than the maximum offer accepted in the round 
were extracted. Confirming our expectation, over 85% of these offered no points, 
with most of these offers purchasing less than 2 (out of up to 40) points.  
 
 A high Q can induce greater competition. However, if quality is important, increasing 
bid caps may be advantageous even though this may reduce competition.  
There is mixed evidence on the impacts of allowing for the purchase of Q points.  
Acquisition costs increase (i.e. for the broad cost sessions, CRR increases from 
1.6 to 1.97), but the quality-adjusted measure decreases (for the broad cost 
sessions, SRR decreases from 1.97 to 1.64). We examine this question more 
carefully in the next section. 
 
The next section looks more carefully at these issues, using linear regression to 




Each observation consists of outcomes from an auction or a “round”
13, using either the 
CRR or SRR as dependent variables.  
As detailed in Table 4, several types of independent variables are used. Of 
primary interest are the treatment dummies that control for the type of auction. Of 
secondary interest are descriptive variables that capture systematic differences between 
the participant pool of the session and the cost structure of the auctions. Lastly, session-
specific dummies are added. These fixed effect parameters capture idiosyncrasies of the 
sessions. For the purposes of brevity, the session-specific fixed effect coefficients are not 
reported. 
                                                 
13 We sometimes refer to an independent auction as a “round”. All auctions were one-shot auctions so there 
should be no confusion about the use of the word round.   - 18 - 
 Regression results 
We used OLS to examine the effects of the treatment and explanatory variables on the 
normalized cost variables.  
We begin with a model that focuses on treatments where no Q points could be 
purchased (Table 5). Note that in all the regressions reported here the first 3 rounds of 
each treatment are removed, so as to allow for learning.
14 
The most striking result is that the bid cutoff variables (the PCT variables as 
described in Table 4) are negative – indicating that a moderately stringent maximum of 
80% will increase acquisition costs. The least cost results are achieved at 90%. Although 
the coefficients are not statistically significant, costs increase once the maximum exceeds 
90%. 
The cost distribution variables suggest that as the spread of ticket costs increases, 
so does the acquisition costs. This is not surprising, since when there is a wide range of 
costs (in a given auction) the difference between the low cost tickets and the cutoff 
(which will be near the median) will tend to increase. Note that a larger average cost (the 
avgCost variable) decreases normalized acquisition cost – if bids do not vary much across 
rounds, then as costs increase (across all tickets),  rents will decrease.  
The 9participants variable is insignificant and small, suggesting that the number 
of participants did not have a noticeable impact on acquisition costs. 
Lastly, the avgDebrief variable, which roughly measures the competency of a 
session’s participants, indicates that more competent groups are more competitive, 
leading to reduced normalized acquisition costs. 
The above models do not account for the impact of Q points. Table 6 incorporates 
all treatments, those with and without the opportunity to purchase Q points. 
Comparing the results in Table 6 with the “no Q points” treatments reported in 
Table 5, the key parameters do not change dramatically. Total acquisition cost is now 
minimized with a bid cap of 100%.  
                                                 
14  We also ran regressions where other quantities of early round tickets were dropped, ranging from one to 
6. In addition, we ran a Huber M estimate (as supported by SAS RobustReg estimator), where only the first 
round per treatment is dropped.  Since the results of these several alternatives were qualitatively similar, we 
only report the results of the “drop 3” regressions.    - 19 - 
What is the impact of the capability to purchase Q points? First, as expected, in 
the CRR model points always increase acquisition costs. Since participants can increase 
their earnings without changing their scores, we expect that acquisition costs will 
increase as Q increases. This is evident from the large coefficient on Q40. 
Of greater interest is the impact of points on the score. The implicit assumption is 
that score is what matters – that the purchaser (say, USDA) values additional quality 
points just as much as dollar savings. As expected, this capability lowers the score rent 
ratio (the quality adjusted acquisition costs) with greater magnitude and significance as 
Q increases.  
The P200xQ40 variable supports this (albeit with weak significance). In these 
auctions, group A bidders (with low maximums and low costs) can now substantially 
increase their bids. Bids can be raised to a level where competition occurs (that is, their 
bids can now exceed the maximum accepted bid). Thus, these low-cost, low-maximum 
bidders have a large incentive to increase their bids, and to purchase points. 
The avgUnder% variable is a measure of participant competence. At a value of 0, 
all bidders are optimally using their points (to increase earnings without affecting their 
ticket scores). The negative value of the coefficient on avgUnder%, while not statistically 
significant, suggests that acquisition costs are lower in rounds where participants are 
behaving suboptimally. This is unexpected, since in these rounds participants are leaving 
cash (and points) on the table. 
In contrast to avgUnder%, extraInfo suggests that when participants are trained to 
optimally use points (when hints are given), acquisition costs for scores diminish 
substantially.  
Although the broadCost variable is not significant, perhaps the overall cost 
environment (broad vs. narrow) has other impacts. Table 7 considers each cost 
environment separately, using SRR as the dependent variable. Table 8 considers just cost, 
so it uses CRR as the dependent variable. 
When comparing across the different cost ranges, both tables indicate that 
increasing the bid cap (the maximum bid) has greater impact in the broader cost range 
sessions. This may not be surprising, given the greater rents that are available to low cost 
tickets in these sessions. Table 8 indicates that the impact of the ability to purchase Q   - 20 - 
points is strong in both the broad and narrow cost range sessions. However, due to a lack 
of variety in treatments, the impacts of many points and a high maximum is difficult to 
detect in the broad session (the P200xQ40 coefficient suggests these two features negate 
each other).  
Summary  
 
Voluntary conservation programs, such the Conservation Reserve Program, often have 
multiple goals. In addition to the multiple conservation goals (such as protecting water 
quality and establishing wildlife habitat), there can be several administrative goals. These 
include minimizing government expenditures, maximizing program efficiency (by 
avoiding retirement of the most productive lands), and encouraging participation by a 
broad range of eligible landowners. 
To achieve these goals may be difficult, especially when heterogeneous land is 
eligible for the programs. Thus, some form of a competitive enrollment mechanism is 
often used. For example, the CRP ranks offers on an index that combines environmental 
impacts and cost, and accepts the fraction of offers that exceeds a target score. In 
addition, the CRP imposes an offer maximum based on a measure of the land’s 
agricultural value. 
In this work, we consider two concerns with this type of mechanism, focusing on 
an environment in which the costs of potential participants are heterogeneous and are 
only approximately known by the purchaser. First, what are the consequences of different 
bid caps? If bid maximums are set too high, low-cost land may earn excessively high 
rents. If maximums are set too low, low-cost lands may not be offered by their owners, or 
attractive but costly land may not be offered. Second, what are the consequences of 
allowing landowners to improve the quality of their offers, in addition to setting the price 
of their offers? If quality is a goal of the program, it is important to consider how the 
stringency of offer maximums may impact landowner willingness to engage in quality 
improving practices.  
To address these questions, we conducted laboratory experiments. A number of 
treatments were implemented that approximated different characteristics of possible 
auctions. These included varying the stringency of the offer maximums, the amount of   - 21 - 
quality that participants could add to their offer, and the distribution of costs. Cost 
heterogeneity was implemented by assigning participants to groups that had different cost 
ranges. A purchasing agent possessing imprecise information was incorporated into the 
experimental design, as the buyer could identify each participant’s group membership, 
but not their actual costs.  
The impacts of mechanism characteristics were measured by linear regression on 
aggregate measures defined for each auction. To focus on efficiency, both in terms of 
expenditure minimization and social efficiency, a normalized sum of offers was used as 
the dependent variable, where the normalization factor was the least cost for achieving a 
fixed number of acceptances (for a given auction).  
Our findings support most of our expectations. To start, the more predictable 
behaviors were observed. Auction participants with a maximum cost sufficiently below 
the expected threshold (the cutoff price from the prior auction) almost always bid their 
maximum. These participants rarely purchased Q points.  
We also found that most participants, but not all, made optimal use of Q points—
they purchased as many as possible, and adjusted their offers accordingly. However, a 
non-trivial number of participants did not follow this strategy; which means they left 
money on the table (or unnecessarily reduced their odds of acceptance). A side 
experiment, where explicit hints were given on how to use Q points, did increase optimal 
behavior, but did not result in complete adoption of an optimal strategy.  
Furthermore, somewhat contrary to our expectations, we found that the use of a 
pay-as-bid auction, even in cases where a fairly stringent maximum is imposed, is often 
less cost effective than an idealized Vickrey auction (where all accepted offers receive 
the cost of the least-expensive rejected offer). 
We were especially interested in the impacts of different bid caps, a question we 
had weaker priors on, especially when participants could improve their probability of 
acceptance by purchasing Q points. Experiments using several different group-specific 
bid maximums and Q points maximums (Q) were used to examine this issue.  
We find that a too stringent maximum (80%) is quite a poor performer. When no 
Q points are permitted, the most cost effective maximum is 90%, with acquisition costs 
increasing as the maximum is reduced or increased. In fact, somewhat statistically weak   - 22 - 
evidence indicates that treatments using a 120% maximum tended to have lower 
acquisition costs than treatments with an 80% maximum.  
When Q points are allowed, this pattern held. In addition, although total 
expenditure is increasing in the opportunity to purchase Q points, treatments with higher 
Q point maximums tend to be more “score effective”. 
To check for sensitivity to cost ranges (i.e. the difference between low cost and 
high cost ticket groups) we also conducted separate analyses for broad and narrow cost 
treatments. The maximum percent impacts were stronger in the broad costs, while the 
impacts of Q points were somewhat stronger in the narrow cost treatments. This may be 
an artifact of the distribution of treatments, since the narrow treatments had more 
complete coverage of the different maximum-Q points possibilities. 
Conclusions 
 
Our main finding is that aggressive use of cost maximums may be counterproductive. 
First, low-cost bidders may have maximums that are below their actual costs, hence they 
will not participate. If a quantity goal (say, number of acres) is maintained, enrolling 
higher costs acres may be required.  
This phenomenon is even stronger when quality enhancements are permitted, and 
when these quality enhancements are valued by the purchaser. With stringent maximums, 
low cost bidders who are still willing to participate have little incentive to improve their 
offers, since profit maximization occurs when they offer their maximum, with no attempt 
to improve quality. In fact, one often increases quality-adjusted cost effectiveness by 
increasing maximums, since this will induce low-cost bidders to improve the quality of 
their bids by more than the cost demanded. 
Our observations of the data suggest stringent maximums can have two effects. 
First, many tickets will never be profitable – their maximum will be below the cost, and 
thus the tickets will not be offered. Some of these non-offered tickets will be low-cost 
tickets. Thus, in order to obtain the targeted number of tickets, some higher-cost ticket 
will have to be accepted ceteris paribus. Second, it is not difficult for medium cost ticket 
holders to learn this fact (either from these first principles or by observing earlier round 
cut off prices), and they may respond by raising their offers.   - 23 - 
Our findings are based on simple statistics and linear regressions on aggregate 
(auction-level) measures. While strongly suggestive, and by and large expected, this 
analysis is somewhat primitive. Additional sessions with greater field context, that focus 
on pairwise comparisions of selected changes, would be useful. Additionally, analysis 
using a structural model of bidder behavior, tracking the behavior of individual bidders, 
is likely to reveal stronger results.   - 24 - 





As low cost landowners, they should be enrolled. 
A fairly accurate assessment of their costs is available. 
 
Finding a relatively efficient maximum is easiest for landowners in 
a lower-variance group, in the sense that a simple rule (say, offer 
something near the expected maximum) will avoid large 
overpayments and encourage full participation.  
 
Encouraging landowners in a low-cost group to improve the quality 





As low cost landowners, they should be enrolled.  
Assessed values are noisier for this group than for Group A. 
 
Finding an efficient maximum is more difficult when the variance 
of bidder costs is increased. For a given bid cap above the group-






It is probable that several of the marginally acceptable offers will 
come from this group.  
 
Setting a too high maximum means that a few marginal players are 
overpaid. Set too low and you might end up not meeting your goals, 
or being forced to take even higher cost offers from group D. 
 
High cost, high 
variance 
Most of these costs will cause Group D bidders to be uncompetitive. 
 
Maximums in this group may not matter much – if too low and 
most of this group does not participate, there is little impact on 
overall cost (tickets from this group are not likely to be accepted.  
 
In some cases (i.e.; high maximum offers for group A and B), the 
presence of offer from this group might induce more competition. 
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Table 1b – Schedule of Treatments     
 




Maximums?  Points for Sale? 
1 to 5  Broader Cost 
Range 
3 to 7 22 to 41 80% to 120%  0 to 40
6 to 9  Narrower 
Cost Range 









 Broad  Cost 




No Q Points 
Narrow Cost 
Q Points 
# of auction rounds  90 90 59  105 
 
vickreyCosts/optCosts  1.48 (0.50)  1.51 (0.40)  1.31 (1.04)  1.35 (0.30) 
Offers/vickreyCosts  1.02 (0.20)  NA  1.05 (0.10)  NA 
 
The cash rent ratio 
(Offers/optCosts) 
1.6 (0.30)  1.97 (1.80)  1.48 (0.20)  1.8 (0.30) 
The score rent ratio 
(Scores/optQCosts) 
 
NA  1.64 (1.30)  NA  1.21 (0.20) 
profitRate  0.45 (0.20)  0.62 (1.30)  0.36 (0.10)  0.3 (0.15) 
 
Table 3:  Summary of auction results 
  




Maximums  Narrower Costs Auctions  Broader Costs Auctions 
  N  Mean   Std Dev  N  Mean   Std Dev 
80% 
 
16 1.10  0.12  29  1.03  0.16 
90% 
 
26 0.92  0.10  29  0.97  0.11 
100% 
 
5 1.08  0.11    n.a..   
120% 
 
17 1.10  0.89  26  1.07  0.14   - 26 - 
Note: these results only use data from auctions where Q points could not be 
purchased.   - 27 - 
 
 
Table 4 – Descriptive Variables 
 
Treatment Dummy Variables 
 Variable Description  % equal 1 
PCT90  0/1 dummy: 1  if this is a 90% 
maximum auction 
34%  
PCT100  0/1 dummy: 1  if this is a 100% 
maximum auction 
3% 
PCT120  0/1 dummy: 1  if this is a 120% 
maximum auction 
32% 
PCT200  0/1 dummy: 1  if this is a 200% 
maximum auction 
17% 





0/1 dummy: 1  if this is a Q=20 
auction  
26% 
Q40   0/1 dummy: 1  if this is a Q=40 
auction 
27% 
P200xQ40  0/1 dummy: cross of PCT200 and Q40  12% 
P90xQ40  0/1 dummy: cross of PCT90 and Q40  7% 
 
Descriptive Variables 
Variable Description Mean 
(stdDev) 
9Participants  0/1 dummy: 1  if this is a 9 participant auction 
 
33% 




extraInfo  0/1 dummy:  set to 1 if  extra “hints” about optimal 
bids, when quality points can be purchased, were 
discussed at earlier time during this auction’s 
session. Note that treatments with hints were only 
implemented in one of the nine sessions. 
 
7% 
avgDebrief%  Percent of debriefing questions answered correctly 
(in this session) 
 
0.90 (0.05) 
avgCost  Average cost of all tickets in the auction  59.8 (4.7) 
    
SdCost  Standard deviation of all tickets in the auction 
 
26.2 (5.8) 
cDispersion  Ratio of  singleCost and optCosts. This a measure  1.38 (0.2)   - 28 - 
of  the dispersion of costs 
 
avgUnder%  Average amount of forgone profits from non-
optimal use of points (in accepted tickets) 
0.16 (0.2)   - 29 - 
 
Variable With  fixed 
effect dummies 







Intercept  4.46      (7.1)  2.91      (5.8)  3.64   [0.26] 
PCT90  -0.18    (-3.7)  -0.13    (-2.6)  -0.06    [0.021]  
PCT100  -0.12    (-0.9)  -0.13    (-1.0)  -0.16   [0.05] 
PCT120  -0.06    (-1.2)  -0.0015  (-0.03)  -0.13      [0.02] 
     
9Participants  -0.09    (-1.0)  -0.047   (-1.0)  0.075   [0.036] 
avgDebrief%  -2.1      (-3.2)  -0.30     (-0.8)  -1.05    [0.26] 
     
broadCost  0.03      (0.4)  -0.15     (-2.8)  0.0032  [0.03] 
avgCost  -0.036   (-7.1)  -0.041   (-8.6)  -0.030  [0.002] 
sdCost  0.019    (4.1)  0.02     (4.0)  0.019   [0.002] 
cDispersion  0.58      (4.5)  0.69    (5.0)  0.093    [0.056] 
     
# of  fixed 
effect dummies 
4 0 4 
Rsquare  0.83 0.78 0.060 
F-stat (prob)  23.6  (p<0.001)  27 (<0.001)  n.a. 
#observations  77   77  77 
Scale  n.a. n.a. 0.063 
 
Notes: 
 Dependent  variable:  the cash rent ratio (offers/optCosts). 
The PCT variables are relative to the “80% maximum” base case. 
  The POINT variables are relative to the “no points” base case. 
  (t-stats) in parenthesis, [standard error] in brackets (t-stat not reported by SAS). 
# of fixed effect dummies refers to the number of session specific dummies included. Note that 
due to conditioning problems, it was not possible to include a fixed effect dummy for all nine 
sessions. Estimates of these fixed effect coefficients are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 6 – Regression Results, all treatments 
 
Variable Dependent  Variable: 
Offers/optCosts 
Dependent Variable: 
Scores/optQcosts   
Intercept  4.34           (9.4)  4.6          (9.4) 
PCT90  -0.188       (-4.3)  -0.13      ( -2.9) 
PCT100  -0.26         (-3.2)  -0.25       (-2.9) 
PCT120  0.0016       (0.1)  -0.064      (-1.4) 
PCT200  0.32          (4.5)  0.0019     (0.03) 
Q10  0.19          (2.8)  0.080      (1.2) 
Q20  0.15          (3.3)  -0.065     (-1.4) 
Q40  0.33          (6.0)  -0.17      (-2.9) 
P200xQ40  0.15          (2.0)  -0.13      (-1.6) 
    
avgDebrief%  -1.97        (-4.0)  -2.47       (-4.8) 
avgUnder%  -0.14        (-1.4)  -0.059     (-0.6) 
extraInfo  -0.099      (-1.2)  -0.37       (-4.3) 
    
broadCost  0.042        (0.8)  0.10        (1.7) 
avgCost  -0.034      (-11.0)  -0.031     (-9.3) 
sdCost  0.023        (7.4)  0.020      (6.2) 
cDispersion  0.36          (4.1)  0.37        (4.0) 
    
# fixed effect 
dummies 
4 4 
Rsquare  0.84 0.79 
F-stat (prob)  44.7      (p<0.0001)  33.7     (p<0.0001) 
#observations  183 183 
Notes: 
  Dependent  variable:  the  score rent ratio (Scores/optQCosts). 
The first 3 rounds of each treatment are removed. 
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Table 7 – Regression Results for Each Cost Environment, all treatments 
 
Variable  Broader cost range 
(sessions 1 to 5) 
Narrow cost range 
(sessions 6 to 9)   
Intercept  4.57   (10.1)  2.37  (5.5) 
PCT90  -0.17   (-4.1)  -0.0021  (-0.05) 
PCT100  -0.35  (-3.3)  -0.082  (-1.1) 
PCT120  -0.11   (-2.4)  -0.040   (-0.9) 
PCT200  n.a.  0.069  (1.2) 
Q10  -0.034  (-0.7)  n.a. 
Q20  -0.12   (-1.96)  -0.095  (-2.3) 
Q40  n.a.  -0.32    (-7.8) 
P200xQ40  0.069  (0.9)  -0.21   (-3.8) 
P90xQ40  -0.21   (-2.1)  n.a 
    
avgDebrief%  -1.67  (-2.8)  0.31    (0.8) 
avgUnder%  0.045   (-0.23)  0.18   (2.3) 
extraInfo  n.a.  -0.23   (-4.9) 
    
avgCost  -0.043   (-9.1)   -0.025  (-8.7) 
sdCost  0.026  (5.5)  0.015   (4.6) 
cDispersion  0.44   (3.9)  -0.0016  (-0.1) 
    
#   fixed effect 
dummies 
0 0 
Rsquare  0.79 0.88 
F-stat (prob)  23.05  (p<0.0001)  44.5 (p<0.0001) 
#observations  91 92 
Note: 
  Dependent  variable:  the  score rent ratio (Scores/optQCosts). 
The first 3 rounds of each treatment are removed. 
n.a. signifies variables that did not appear in any treatment in these sessions. 
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Table 8 – Regression Results for Each Cost Environment, no points treatments 
 
 
Variable  Broader cost range 
(sessions 1 to 5) 
Narrow cost range 
(sessions 6 to 9)   
Intercept  3.95      (5.6)  2.87      (5.3) 
PCT90  -0.27    (-4.0)  -0.077    (-1.7) 
PCT100  n.a.  -0.10      (-1.52) 
PCT120  -0.10    (-1.5)  -0.03      (0.7) 
     
avgDebrief%  -1.16     (-1.8)  -0.34     (-0.8) 
    
avgCost  -0.046    (-6.7)   -0.026   (-6.6) 
sdCost  0.023     (3.6)  0.019      (4.3) 
cDispersion  0.65       (3.9)  0.069  (0.41) 
    
#   fixed effect 
dummies 
1 0 
Rsquare  0.84 0.79 
F-stat (prob)  29.61  (p<0.0001)  12.5 (p<0.0001) 
#observations  47 30 
 
Notes: 
  Dependent  variable:  the cash rent ratio (Offers/optCosts). 
The first 3 rounds of each treatment are removed. 
n.a. signifies variables that did not appear in any treatment in these sessions. 
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 Appendix: ticket cost range. 
 
When constructing groups, and their associated ticket ranges, our goal was to capture 
important features of a population of potential participants, such as the population of CRP 
eligible landowners. For the sake of efficiency, we do not mimic all the features – 
participants whose costs render them highly unlikely to participate need not be explicitly 
reflected in the experiment design. In addition, we structure the cost ranges to guarantee 
some competition – so that at least for a fraction of the participants there is no obvious 
strategy. That is, given some rough notion as to the probable cutoff  score (say, as 
intuited from prior round results), not everyone has either a maximum  bid below this 
cutoff, or a ticket cost above it.  
Table A2.1 displays the cost range used in the experiment sessions. Note that two 
distributions of ticket costs were used, with the first 5 sessions using the “broader cost 
range,” and the last 4 sessions using the “narrower range”. 
 





Broader cost range 
 
Group  Bottom of cost 
range 
Top of cost range 
A 30  45 
B 10  65 
C 35  95 




Narrower cost range 
 
Group  Bottom of cost 
range 
Top of cost range 
A 35  55 
B 20  80 
C 40  90 
D 45  125 
 
Note:  costs are denominated in  “E-bucks”. E-bucks were converted into real cash at the 
rate of $0.03 per E-buck. 
 
 
For example, a group A ticket in session 3 (a broad cost range session) would 
have a real dollar cost that fell anywhere between $0.90 and $1.35.   - 34 - 
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